Efficient Codes for Adversarial Wiretap Channels by Wang, Pengwei & Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh
ar
X
iv
:1
40
1.
46
33
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
19
 Ja
n 2
01
4
Efficient Codes for Adversarial Wiretap Channels
Pengwei Wang and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Canada
e-mail: [pengwwan, rei]@ucalgary.ca
Abstract—In [13] we proposed a (ρr, ρw)-adversarial wiretap
channel model (AWTP) in which the adversary can adaptively
choose to see a fraction ρr of the codeword sent over the channel,
and modify a fraction ρw of the codeword by adding arbitrary
noise values to them. In this paper we give the first efficient
construction of a capacity achieving code family that provides
perfect secrecy for this channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wyner’s wiretap model [15] channel noise in the channel
is used as a resource for the system designer to provide
(asymptotic) perfect secrecy against a computationally un-
bounded adversary without the need for a shared key. In this
model, a sender and a receiver communicate over a noisy
channel referred as the main channel, and their communication
is eavesdropped by an adversary through a second noisy
channel, referred to as the adversary channel. The goal is
to provide (asymptotic) perfect reliable communication from
sender to receiver with (asymptotic) perfect secrecy against the
adversary. In this model adversary is passive and obstruction
of its view by noise is probabilistic.
Recently a number of models [1], [4], [11] that include a
stronger adversary that can modify communication have been
introduced. These models primarily use arbitrarily varying
channel approach and assume eavesdropper and jammer (who
modifies communication) do not communicate. We introduced
[13] an adversarial model for wiretap channel in which the ad-
versary can adaptively choose a fraction of the communicated
codeword to see and a fraction to modify. The modification
of each component is by adding (algebraic) an arbitrary value
(adversary’s choice) to the component. The adversary’s choice
of observation and tampering components is unrestricted, as
long as the total number of observation and tampering symbols
are within specific limits. An Adversary Wiretap Channel
(AWTP) is specific by two parameters (ρr, ρw) and is denoted
by (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. An (ǫ, δ)-AWTP code guarantees
that the information leaked about the message (measured using
statistical distance) and the probability of decoding failure are
upper bounded by ǫ and δ, respectively. The information rate
of a code C is R(C) = log |M|N log |Σ| where N is the length of the
code and M is the message space. The code provides perfect
secrecy if ǫ = 0.
We derived an upper bound on the rate of codes for (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channels as R(C) ≤ 1 − ρr − ρw + 2ǫ log|Σ| 1ǫ , and
code family with perfect secrecy is R(C) ≤ 1 − ρr − ρw.
An explicit and inefficient construction of AWTP code is also
given in [13].
A. Our Result
We give an efficient construction of a code family C =
{CN ;N ∈ Z} in which every code CN of length N , provides
perfect secrecy for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. The construc-
tion uses three building blocks: an Algebraic Manipulate De-
tection Code (AMD code) [5], a Subspace Evasive Sets. (SES)
[7], and a Folded Reed-Solomon code (FRS code) [8]. AMD
code detects algebraic manipulation assuming the adversary is
oblivious and does not have access to the codeword. SES are
subsets with the property that their intersection with any subset
of certain dimension is bounded. FRS code is a special class
of Reed-Solomon code that achieve list decoding capacity,
and have efficient encoding and decoding. Encoding of a
message uses the three building blocks in order: the message
is encoded using AMD code, then using a SES and finally an
FRS code. In decoding, first the FRS decoder outputs a list
of possible codewords. This list for the decoding algorithm in
[8], is a function of N , the code length. Using the intersection
algorithm of SES the list can be pruned to a shorter list which
is independent of the code length. The final step is to use the
AMD code to find the correct message. The decoder always
outputs the correct message. We prove with appropriate choice
of parameters, each code in the family is perfectly secure,
satisfies the upper bound on rate for (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels
with equality and so is capacity achieving, and finally the
probability of decoding error reduces exponentially in N .
B. Related Work
Wiretap channels have been an active area of research for
a number of years with excellent progress on extending the
model and strengthening security against passive adversary
[2], [3], [6], [9]–[12]. More recently active adversary for these
channels have been considered [1], [4], [11], [13]. The active
adversary in [4], [11] is modeled using arbitrarily varying
channels, and is assumed that there is no communication
between the eavesdropper and the wiretapper. In [1] the
wiretap II model is extended to active adversary. The adversary
however is restricted to flip the codeword components that
they have chosen to read. In [14] we proposed a model for
adversarial channel called limited view adversarial channel
(LVAC), which is the same as the adversarial channel consid-
ered here. The goal of communication however was reliability
only. (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels have the same adversary power
as LVAC channel, but the goal of communication is reliability
and privacy both.
Paper orgnization: In section II, we recall the model and
capacity results for ((ρr , ρw))-AWTP channels. In section III,
we give our construction and conclude the paper in section
IV.
II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider the following scenario. Alice (Sender S) wants
to a send messages m ∈ M securely and reliably to Bob
(Receiver R), over a communication channel that is partially
controlled by Eve (Adversary). Let [N ] = {1, · · · , N}.
Sr = {i1, · · · , iρrN} ⊆ [N ] and Sw = {j1, · · · , jρwN} ⊆ [N ]
denote two subsets of the N coordinates. For a vector x,
SUPP(x) denotes the set of coordinates where xi is non-zero.
Let Σ denote the code alphabet, with an underlying group
operation.
Definition 1: [13] A (ρr, ρw)-Adversarial Wiretap chan-
nel ((ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel), is an adversarially corrupted
communication channel between Alice and Bob such that it
is (partially) controlled by an adversary Eve, with two capa-
bilities: Reading and Writing. In Reading (or Eavesdropping
), Eve selects a subset Sr ⊆ [N ] of size at most ρrN and
sees the components of the sent codeword c on Sr. Eve’s
view of the codeword is the set of all read components:
ViewA(AWTPenc(m, rS), rA) = {ci1 , · · · , ciρrN }. In Writing
(or Jamming), Eve chooses a subset Sw ⊆ [N ] of size at most
ρwN and adds an error vector e to c, where the addition is
component-wise and over Σ. We require SUPP(e) = Sw.
The corrupted components of c are {yj1 , · · · , yjρwN} and
yjℓ = cjℓ + ejℓ . The error e is generated according to the
Eve’s best strategy to make Bob’s decoder fail.
The adversary is adaptive and selects components of c for
reading and writing, one by one and at each step using its
knowledge of the codeword at that time.
Alice and Bob will use an Adversarial Wiretap Code to pro-
vide security and reliability for communication over Adversary
wiretap channel.
Definition 2: [13] An (M, N,Σ, ǫ, δ)-AWTP Code ((ǫ, δ)-
AWTP code for short) for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel consists
of a randomized encoding AWTPenc : M× U → C, from
the message space M to a code C, and a deterministic
decoding algorithm AWTPdec : ΣN → {M ∪ ⊥}, such that
AWTPdec(AWTPenc(m, rS)) = m for all m ∈ M. The code
guarantees secrecy and reliability as defined below.
i) Secrecy: For any two messages m1,m2 ∈ M, we have
Advds(AWTPenc,ViewA)
△
=
max
m0,m1
SD(ViewA(AWTPenc(m1), rA),
ViewA(AWTPenc(m2), rA)) ≤ ǫ
Here we assume the adversary uses the same random coins
rA for the encoding of two messages.
ii) Reliability: For any message m that is encoded to c by the
sender, and corrupted to y = c + e by the (ρr, ρw)- AWTP
channel, the probability that the receiver outputs the correct
information m is at least 1 − δ. Receiver will output ⊥ with
probability no more than δ and will never output an incorrect
message. That is,
P[AWTPdec(AWTPenc(m) + e) =⊥] ≤ δ
An AWTP code is perfectly secure if ǫ = 0.
Definition 3: For a fixed ǫ > 0, an ǫ-secure AWTP code
family is a family C = {CN}N∈N of (ǫ, δN )-AWTP codes
indexed by N ∈ N, for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. When ǫ =
0, the family is called a perfectly secure AWTP code family.
Definition 4: For a family C of (ǫ, δ)-AWTP codes the rate
R(C) is achievable if for any ξ > 0, there exists N0 such that
for any N ≥ N0, we have, 1N log|Σ| |MN | ≥ R(C) − ξ, and
the probability of decoding error is δ ≤ ξ.
We use the achievable rate of a code family for an AWTP
channel to define secrecy capacity of the channel.
Definition 5: The ǫ-secrecy (perfect secrecy) capacity of a
(ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel denoted by Cǫ (C0), is the largest
achievable rate of all (ǫ, δ)-AWTP ((0, δ)-AWTP) code fami-
lies C for the channel.
The following upper bounds are derived in [13].
Lemma 1: [13] The ǫ-secrecy capacity of a (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channel satisfies the upper bound,
Cǫ ≤ 1− ρr − ρw + 2ǫρrN log|Σ|(1 +
1
ǫ
)
The upper bound for the perfect secrecy capacity of a (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channel is, C0 ≤ 1− ρr − ρw.
III. AN EFFICIENT CAPACITY ACHIEVING AWTP-CODE
The general approach to the construction was outlined in
Section I-A. Below we recall the definition of the building
blocks, and give our instantiations, and construction of the
code.
1) Algebraic Manipulation Detection Code (AMD code):
Consider a storage device Σ(G) that holds an element x from a
group G. The storage Σ(G) is private but can be manipulated
by the adversary by adding ∆ ∈ G. AMD code allows the
manipulation to be detected.
Definition 6 (AMD-code [5]): An (X ,G, δ)-Algebraic Ma-
nipulation Detection code ((X ,G, δ)-AMD code) consists
of two algorithms (AMDenc,AMDdec). Encoding given by,
AMDenc : X → G, is probabilistic and maps an element
of a set X to an element of an additive group G. Decoding,
AMDdec : G → X ∪ {⊥}, is deterministic and we have
AMDdec(AMDenc(x)) = x, for any x ∈ X . Security of AMD
codes is defined by requiring,
P[AMDdec(AMDenc(x) + ∆) ∈ {x,⊥}] ≤ δ, (1)
for all x ∈ X ,∆ ∈ G.
An AMD code is systematic if the encoding has the form
AMDenc : X → X × G1 × G2, x → (x, r, t = f(x, r))
for some function f and r $← G1. The decoding function
AMDdec(x, r, t) = x if and only if t = f(x, r) and ⊥
otherwise.
We use a systematic AMD-code that is based on the exten-
sion of the construction in [5] to extension fields. Let φ be a
bijection between vectors v of length N over Fq , and elements
in FqN , and let ℓ be an integer such that ℓ+2 is not divisible
by q. Define the function AMDenc : FℓqN → F
ℓ
qN ×FqN ×FqN
by AMDenc(x) = (x, r, f(x, r)) where
f(x, r) = φ−1
(
φ(r)ℓ+2 +
ℓ∑
i=1
φ(xi)φ(r)
i
)
mod qN
Lemma 2: For the AMD-code above, given a codeword
(x, r, t), the success chance of an adversary that has no
information about (x, r, t), in constructing a new codeword
(x′, r′, t′) = (x′ = x + ∆x, r′ = r + ∆r, t′ = t + ∆t), that
passes the verification t′ = f(x′, r′) is at most ℓ+1
qN
.
2) Subspace Evasive Sets: We briefly introduce subspace
evasive sets. More details can be found in Appendix A.
Definition 7 (Subspace Evasive Sets [7], [8]): Let S ⊂
F
n
q . We say S is (v, ℓSE)-subspace evasive if for all v-
dimensional affine subspaces H ⊂ Fnq , we have |S∩H| ≤ ℓSE.
Dvir et al. [7] show that there is an efficient construction
for subspace evasive sets S ⊂ Fnq , and an efficient intersection
algorithm to compute S ∩ H for any v-dimensional subspace
H ⊂ Fnq .
Lemma 3: [7] Let v, n1 ∈ N, w = v2, n = n1w−vw and
Fq be a finite field. Then there is a (v, vv·C log log v)-subspace
evasive set S ⊂ Fnq . For any vector v ∈ Fn1q , there is a
bijection which maps v into an elements of the subspace
evasive set. That is
SE : v → v′ ∈ S
Lemma 4: [7] Let S ⊂ Fnq be the (v, ℓSE)-subspace evasive
set. There exists an algorithm that, given a basis for any H,
output S ∩ H in O(vv·log log v) time.
3) Folded Reed-Solomon Code (FRS code): A error cor-
recting code C is a subspace of FNq . The rate of the code is
log2 |C|/N . A code C of length N and rate R is (ρ, ℓList)-
list decodable if the number of codewords within distance ρN
from any received word is at most ℓList. List decodable codes
can potentially correct up to 1−R fraction of errors, which is
twice that of unique decoding. This is however at the cost of
outputting a list of possible sent codewords (messages). Con-
struction of good code with efficient list decoding algorithms
is an important research question. An explicit construction of
a list decodable code that achieves the list decoding capacity
ρ = 1 − R − ε is given by Guruswami et al. [8]. The code
is called Folded Reed-Solomon codes (FRS codes), defined
by Guruswami et al. [8], gives an explicit construction for
list decodable codes that achieve the list decoding capacity
ρ = 1 − R − ε. The code has polynomial time encoding and
decoding algorithms.
Definition 8: [8] A u-Folded Reed-Solomon code is an
error correcting code with block length N over Fuq and q >
Nu. The message of an FRS code is written in the form of a
polynomial f(x) with degree k over Fq . The FRS codeword
corresponding to the message is a vector over Fuq where each
component is a u-tuple (f(γju), f(γju+1), · · · , f(γju+u−1)),
0 ≤ j < N , where γ is a generator of F∗q , the multiplicative
group of Fq . A codeword of a u-folded Reed-Solomon code
of length N is in one-to-one correspondence with a codeword
c of a Reed-Solomon code of length uN , and is obtained
by grouping together u consecutive components of c. We use
FRSenc to denote the encoding algorithm of the FRS code. u
is called the folding parameter of the FRS code.
We will use the linear algebraic FRS decoding algorithm of
these codes [8] (Appendix B-A). The following Lemma gives
the decoding capability of linear algebraic FRS code.
Lemma 5: [8] For a Folded Reed-Solomon code of block
length N and rate R = kuN , the following holds for all integers
1 ≤ v ≤ u. Given a received word y ∈ (Fuq )N agreeing with
c in at least a fraction,
N − ρN > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
uR
u− v + 1
)
one can compute a matrix M ∈ Fk×(v−1)q and a vector z ∈ Fkq
such that the message polynomials f ∈ Fq[X ] in the decoded
list are contained in the affine space Mb+ z for b ∈ Fv−1q in
O((Nu log q)2) time.
A. An Explicit Capacity Achieving (0, δ)-AWTP Code Family
Let M denote the message space, N denote the code length
and the encoding and decoding algorithms be, AWTPencN
and AWTPdecN , respectively. The message, also referred
to as the information block of the AWTP code, is m =
{m1, · · · ,muRN} ∈ M where mi ∈ Fq. Let S be a
(v, vC·v·log log v)-subspace evasive set in Fnq . Let u and v
denote the folding and the interpolation parameters of the
FRS code, respectively. Let q be a prime number larger than
Nu, γ be a primitive element of Fq, ℓ = ⌈uR⌉, w = v2,
b = ⌈ ℓN+2Nw−v ⌉, n1 = (w − v)b, n = wb, SE : F
n1
q → S be the
bijection of subspace evasive set.
The construction of encoder and decoder for CN is given
in Figure III-A.
Figure III-A
Encoding: For a code rate R, the sender S does the
following.
1) Start with the information block m of length uRN .
Append sufficient zeros N(ℓ − uR) to construct a
vector x of length Nℓ; that is, x = {m||0, · · · , 0}.
2) Generate a random vector r with length N over
Fq. Use the AMD construction in section III-1 to
construct the AMD codeword {x, r, t}. That is,
AMDenc(x) = {x, r, t}. The length of AMD code
is ℓN + 2N .
3) Extend the AMD codeword to length n1 by append-
ing zeros. Encode AMD code into an element s of
the subspace evasive set S. The length of s is n.
That is
s = SE(x, r, t||0, · · · , 0)
4) Append a random vector a = {a1 · · · auρrN} ∈
FuρrNq to s to form a vector that will be the
message of the FRS code, and interpret that as
coefficients of the polynomial f(x) over Fq . That
is {f0, · · · , fk−1} = (s||a). We have k = deg(f)+
1 = uρrN + n.
5) Use FRSenc to construct the FRS codeword
c = FRSenc(f(X)) = {c1, · · · , cN}, and ci =
{f(γi(u−1)), · · · , f(γiu−1)} ∈ Fuq , i = 1, · · · , N .
Decoding: The receiver R does the following:
1) Let y = c + e, and wH(e) ≤ ρwN . The i-
th component of y is yi = {yi,1, · · · , yi,u} for
i = 1, · · · , N .
2) Use the FRS decoding algorithm FRSdec(y) to
output a matrix M ∈ Fk×vq and a vector z ∈ Fkq ,
such that the codewords in the output list are,
LFRS = Mb + z. M has k rows each giving a
component of the output vector as a linear com-
bination of {b1, · · · , bv}. Let H denote the space
which is generated by the first n equations. That is
H = Mn×vb+ zn,b ∈ F
v
q ,
where Mn×v is the first n rows of the submatrix
of Mn×v and zn is the first n elements of z.
3) The decoder calculates the intersection S ∩ H and
outputs a list L with size at most vC·v·log log v .
Each si ∈ L corresponds to an AMD codeword
{xi, ri, ti}.
4) For each AMD codeword {xi, ri, ti}, the decoder
verifies ti = f(xi, ri). If there is a unique valid
AMD codeword, the decoder outputs the first uRN
components of x as the correct message m. Other-
wise, outputs ⊥.
We prove secrecy and reliability, and derive the rate of
AWTP code family.
Lemma 6 (Secrecy): The AWTP code C provides perfect
security for (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel.
Proof: We show that an AWTP codeword sent over
an (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel leak no information about the
encoded subspace evasive sets element s and so the message m
will remain perfectly secure. Let S,A,C [r] denote the random
variables corresponding to s, a and c[r] = {cj1 , · · · , cjρrN},
respectively. For an adversary observation {ci1 , · · · , ciρrN }
with cij = {cij ,1, · · · , cij ,u} ∈ Fuq , using the FRS encoding
equations, the adversary has the following uρrN equations.

1 γ(i1−1)u · · · γ(i1−1)u(k−1)
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
1 γi1u−1 · · · γ(i1u−1)(k−1)
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
1 γ(iρrN−1)u · · · γ(iρrN−1)u(k−1)
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
1 γiρrNu−1 · · · γ(iρrNu−1)(k−1)


×
[
s
a
]
=


ci1,1
.
.
.
ci1,u
.
.
.
ciρrN ,1
.
.
.
ciρrN,u


It is easy to see that s together with the randomness a uniquely
determines c[r]. This gives,
P(C [r] = c[r] | {S,A} = {s, a}) = 1. (2)
Conversely, for given values of s and {ci1 , · · · , ciρrN }, and
noting that the coefficient matrix is Vandermonde, there exists
a unique solution for the uρrN unknown components of a =
{a1, · · · , auρrN} ∈ F
uρrN
q . That is
P(A = a | {S,C [r]} = {s, c[r]}) = 1 (3)
Since a is chosen uniformly and independent of s, we have
P(A = a | S = s) =
1
quρrN
(4)
From (2),(3), and (4) we have,
P(C [r] = c[r], A = a | S = s)
= P(A = a|{S,C [r]} = {s, c[r]})P(C [r] = c[r]|S = s)
= P(C [r] = c[r]|{S,A} = {s, a})P(A = a|S = s),
which implies for any s,
P(C [r] = c[r]|S = s) =
1
quρrN
. (5)
This means that for any two elements s1 and s2 of the subspace
evasive sets,
SD(ViewA | s1,ViewA | s2)
=
∑
c
[r]∈ViewA
1
2
|P(c[r]|s1)− P(c
[r]|s2)| = 0
Lemma 7 (Reliability): The failure probability of
AWTPdecN is bounded by δN ≤ v
C·v·log log v
qN
.
Proof: The FRS decoder outputs a list of elements of
the subspace evasive si ∈ L with list size at most ℓSE ≤
vC·v·log log v . Each element corresponds to a unique AMD
codeword {xi, ri, ti} = SE−1(si).
We first show that the correct message m will be always
output by the receiver. Denote the AMD codeword correspond-
ing to the message m as {x, r, t} = AMDenc(m||0, · · · , 0).
The list decoding algorithm outputs codewords that are at
distance at most ρwN of the received word and so include
the original codeword. The bijection function SE, encodes the
AMD codeword into an element of the subspace evasive set
s ∈ S that belongs to the decoded list s ∈ H that passes AMD
verification. That is,
SE(x, r, t||0, · · · , 0) ∈ L = S ∩ H and t = f(x, r)
Second, we show that the probability that any other code-
word in the list is a valid AMD codeword is small. That is we
will show that,
P({x′, r′, t′} = SE−1(s′) ∧ s′ ∈ L ∧ t′ = f(x′, r′)) ≤
ℓ
qN
From Lemma 6, the adversary has no information about
the encoded subspace evasive sets element s and the AMD
codeword {x, r, t} = SE−1(s) and so the adversary error,
{∆xi = x
′ − x,∆ri = r
′ − r,∆ti = t
′ − t}, is independent
of {x, r, t}. According to Lemma 2, the probability that the
tampered AMD codeword, {x′, r′, t′}, passes the verification
is no more than ℓqN .
Finally, we show the unique correct message output by
receiver with probability at least 1− vC
′
·v·log log v
qN
. The list size
is at most vC·v·log log v and ℓ ≤ u = v2. So the probability that
any {x′, r′, t′} 6= {x, r, t} in decoding list pass the verification
t′ = f(x′, r′), is no more than v
(C+2)·v·log log v
qN . That is
P(
⋃
s
′∈L
{x′, r′, t′} = SE−1(s′) ∧ t′ = f(x′, r′))
≤
∑
s
′∈L
P({x′, r′, t′} = SE−1(s′) ∧ t′ = f(x′, r′))
≤
∑
s
′∈L
P(t′ = f(x′, r′)) ≤
ℓ|L|
qN
≤
v(C+2)·v·log log v
qN
We first find the information rate of the code CN , and then
find the achievable rate of the code family C.
Lemma 8 (Rate of CN ): The AWTP code CN described
above provides reliability for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel if the
following holds:
ρw <
v
v + 1
−
v
v + 1
v
v−1 (uR+ 3) + uρr
u− v + 1
. (6)
Proof is in Appendix C.
Lemma 9 (Achievable Rate of C): The information rate of
the (0, δ)-AWTP code family C = {CN}N∈N for a (ρr, ρw)-
AWTP channel is R(C) = 1− ρr − ρw.
Proof: For a given small 12 > ξ > 0, let code parameters
be chosen as, ξ1 = ξ13 , v = 1/ξ1 and u = 1/ξ
2
1 . Finally let,
N0 > (1/ξ)
C/ξ log log 1/ξ where C > 0 is constant. From
1−R − ρr − 12ξ1 ≤
1
ξ1 + 1
−
1
ξ1 + 1
1
1−ξ1
(R + 3ξ21) + ρr
1− ξ1 + ξ21
the decoding condition (6) of AWTP code is satisfied if,
ρw < 1−R− ρr − 12ξ1. (7)
We choose R = 1−ρr−ρw−12ξ1, the decoding condition
of AWTP code will be satisfied. Now since ξ = 13ξ1, for any
N > N0, the rate of the AWTP code CN is
1
N
log|Σ| |MN | = R = 1− ρr − ρw − 12ξ1
> 1− ρr − ρw − ξ = R(C)− ξ
and the probability of decoding error,
δN ≤ (1/ξ)
C/ξ log log 1/ξq−N ≤ Nq−N ≤ ξ
So the information rate of AWTP code family C is R(C) =
1− ρr − ρw.
The computational time for encoding is O((N log q)2).
The decoding of FRS code and intersection algorithm of
the subspace evasive set is O((1/ξ)C/ξ log log 1/ξ). The AMD
verification is O((1/ξ)C/ξ log log 1/ξ(N log q)2). So the total
computational time of decoding is O((N log q)2).
Theorem 1: For any small ξ > 0, there is (0, δ)-AWTP
code CN of length N over (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel such that
the information rate is R(CN ) = 1− ρr − ρw − ξ, the size of
alphabet is |Σ| = O(q1/ξ2 ) and decoding error δ < q−O(N).
The computational time is O((N log q)2). The AWTP code
family C = {CN}N∈N achieves secrecy capacity R(C) =
1− ρr − ρw for (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
((ρr, ρw))-AWTP extends Wyner wiretap models [1] to
include active corruption at physical layer of communication
channel. Although corruption in our general model is additive,
for Sw ⊂ Sr, it is equivalent to arbitrary replacement of
code components. We proposed an efficient construction for a
capacity achieving code family for (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channels.
The alphabet size for the code is Fuq where for δ < ξ,
u = O( 1ξ2 ) . That is for small failure probability, larger size
alphabet must be used. Constructing capacity achieving codes
over small (fixed) size alphabets remains an open problem.
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APPENDIX A
SUBSPACE EVASIVE SETS
Recently, Guruswami et al. [8] showed that the subspace
evasive sets can be used to reduce the list size of list decoding
algorithm. Dvir et al. [7] gives a explicit and efficient construc-
tion of subspace evasive sets. We briefly introduce Dvir et al.
[7]’s construction of subspace evasive sets. In detail, we give
the definition of subspace evasive set, the construction, the
encoding function, and the bound of the size of intersection
between subspace evasive sets and any v-dimensional space.
Definition 9: [8] [7] Let S ⊂ Fn. We say S is (v, ℓSE)-
subspace evasive sets if for all v-dimensional affine subspaces
H ⊂ Fn, there is |S ∩ H| ≤ ℓSE.
A. Construction of Subspace Evasive Set
Let F be a field and F be its algebraic closure. A variety in
F
w is the set of common zeros of one or more polynomials.
Given v polynomials f1, · · · , fv ∈ F[x1, · · · , xw], we denote
the variety as
V(f1, · · · , fv) = {x ∈ F
w
| f1(x) = · · · = fv(x) = 0}
where x = {x1, · · · , xw}.
For a polynomials f1, · · · , fv ∈ F[x1, · · · , xw], we define
the common solutions in Fw as
VF(f1, · · · , fv) = V(f1, · · · , fv) ∩ F
w
= {x ∈ Fw | f1(x) = · · · = fv(x) = 0}
We say that a v × w matrix is strongly-regular if all its
r × r minors are regular for all 1 ≤ r ≤ v. For instance, if F
is a field with at least w distinct nonzero elements γ1, · · · , γw,
then Ai,j = γij is strongly-regular.
Lemma 10: (Theorem 3.2 [7]) Let v ≥ 1, ε > 0 and F be a
finite field. Let w = v/ε and w divides n. Let A be a v × w
matrix with coefficients in F which is strongly-regular. Let
d1 > · · · > dw be integers. For i ∈ [v] let
fi(x1, · · · , xw) =
w∑
j=1
Ai,jx
dj
j
and define the subspace evasive sets S ∈ Fn to be (n/w)
times cartesian product of VF(f1, · · · , fv) ⊂ Fw. That is
S = VF(f1, · · · , fv)× · · · ×VF(f1, · · · , fv)
= {x ∈ Fn : fi(xtw+1, · · · , xtw+w) = 0,
∀0 ≤ t < n/w, 1 ≤ i ≤ v}
Then S is (v, (d1)v)-subspace evasive sets.
Moreover, if at least v of the degrees d1, · · · , dw are co-
prime to |F| − 1, then |S| = |F|(1−ε)n.
The size of list is bounded by d1 and v. If we can bound
d1 by v, the list size can be only bounded by the v-dimension
subspace H.
Lemma 11: (Claim 4.3 [7]) There exists a constant C > 0
such that the following holds: There is a deterministic algoritm
that, given integer inputs v,N so that in Poly(N) time there is
prime q and v integers vC log log v > d1 > d2 > · · · > dv > 1
such that:
1) For all i ∈ [v], gcd(q − 1, di) = 1
2) N < q ≤ N · vC log log v
Because we only need to choose w integer d1 > · · · > dw
and v of the integers are co-prime to q, the bound of d1 is
d1 ≤ max(w, v
C log log v).
B. Encoding Vector as Elements in S
We show the encoding map SE : v → s. Assuming there
is a vector v of length n1 and (w − v)|n1. First we divide
the vector into n1w−v blocks. Then for each block vi for i =
1, · · · , n1w−v , we encode into a block si using bijection ϕ. Then
we concatenate each block si for i = 1, · · · , n1w−v and generate
s in S. We give the function ϕ in the following.
Lemma 12: (Claim 4.1) Assume that at least v of the degree
d1, · · · , dv are co-prime to |F| − 1. Then there is an easy to
compute bijection ϕ : Fw−v → VF ⊂ Fw. Moreover, there
are w− v coordinates in the output of ϕ that can be obtained
from the identity mapping Id : Fw−v → Fw−v.
Let dj1 , · · · , djv be the degree among d1, · · · , dw co-prime
to |F| − 1 and let J = {j1, · · · , jv} and x
dji
ji
= yi. On the
positions [w]\J , the map ϕ takes the elements from Fw−v to
F[w]\J . For the elements on J , there is∑
j∈J
Ai,jx
dj
j = −
∑
j /∈J
Ai,jx
dj
j
Let A′ be the v × v minor of A given by restricting A to
columns in J and bi = −
∑
j /∈J Ai,jx
dj
j . Then
A′y = b
and for each y, there is unique solution of xdjiji = yi mod q
because dji is co-prime to q − 1.
C. Computing Intesection
We show how to compute the intersection S ∩ H given
(v, ℓSE) subspace evasive sets S and v-dimension subspace
H. The subspace evasive sets S will filter out the elements in
H and output a set of elements S ∩H with size no more than
ℓSE.
Lemma 13: (Claim 4.2 [7]) Let S ⊂ Fn be the (v, ℓSE)-
subspace evasive sets. There exists an algorithm that, given a
basis of H, output S ∩ H in Poly((d1)v) time.
Because H is v-dimensional subspace and H ⊂ Fn, there
exists a set of affine maps {ℓ1, · · · , ℓn} such that for any el-
ements x = {x1, · · · , xm} ∈ H, there is xi = ℓi(s1, · · · , sv).
We show the result by induction of the number of blocks
i = 1, · · · , n/w. If i = 1, let H1 := {(x1, · · · , xw) :
(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ H}, the dimension of H1 is r1 ≤ v and
Hx1,··· ,xw = {(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ H : (x1, · · · , xw)} such
that H = ∪(x1,··· ,xw)∈H1Hx1,··· ,xw , and the dimension of
Hx1,··· ,xw is v − r1. There is
VF(f1, · · · , fv) ∩H1
= {(x1, · · · , xw) = (ℓ1(s1, · · · , sv), · · · , ℓw(s1, · · · , sv)) :
f1(ℓ1(s1, · · · , sv), · · · , ℓw(s1, · · · , sv)) = 0, · · · ,
fv(ℓ1(s1, · · · , sv), · · · , ℓw(s1, · · · , sv)) = 0}
We can solve the v equations to get (s1, · · · , sv) and then
obtain (x1, · · · , xw). Since H1 ⊂ Fw,
VF(f1, · · · , fv) ∩H1 = V(f1, · · · , fv) ∩H1
By Bezout’s theorem, there is |V(f1, · · · , fv)∩H1| ≤ (d1)r1 .
So there are at most (d1)r1 solutions for (x1, · · · , xw) ∈ H1.
The computational time of solving the equation system follows
from powerful algorithms that can solve a system of polyno-
mial equations (over finite fields) in time polynomial in the
size of the output, provided that the number of solutions is
finite in the algebraic closure (i.e the zero-dimensional case).
So for i = 1, the computational time is at most Poly((d1)r1)
and there are (d1)r1 solutions for (x1, · · · , xw).
For every fixed of the first w coordinates, we reduce the
dimension of H by r1 and obtained a new subspace H2 on the
remaining coordinates. Continuing in the same fashion with
H2 on the second block we can compute all the solutions
in times Poly((d1)r1) ·Poly((d1)r2) · · ·Poly((d1)rn/w), where
r1 + r2 + · · · + rn/w = v. So the total running time is
Poly((d1)
v).
APPENDIX B
LIST DECODABLE CODE
A. Decoding algorithm of FRS code
Linear algebraic list decoding [8] has two main steps:
interpolation and message finding as outlined below.
• Find a polynomial, Q(X,Y1, · · · , Yv) = A0(X) +
A1(X)Y1 + · · · + Av(X)Yv, over Fq such that
deg(Ai(X)) ≤ D, for i = 1 · · · v, and deg(A0(X)) ≤
D + k − 1, satisfying Q(αi, yi1 , yi2 , · · · , yiv ) = 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ n0, where n0 = (u− v + 1)N .
• Find all polynomials f(X) ∈ Fq[X ] of degree at most k−
1, with coefficients f0, f1 · · · fk−1, that satisfy, A0(X)+
A1(X)f(X)+A2(X)f(γX)+· · ·+Av(X)f(γ
v−1X) =
0, by solving linear equation system.
The two above requirements are satisfied if f ∈ Fq[X ] is
a polynomial of degree at most k − 1 whose FRS encoding
agrees with the received word y in at least t components:
t > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
uR
u− v + 1
)
This means we need to find all polynomials f(X) ∈ Fq[X ]
of degree at most k − 1, with coefficients f0, f1, · · · , fk−1,
that satisfy,
A0(X) +A1(X)f(X) +A2(X)f(γX) + · · ·
+Av(X)f(γ
v−1X) = 0
Let us denote Ai(X) =
∑D+k−1
j=0 ai,jX
j for 0 ≤ i ≤ v.
(ai,j = 0 when i ≥ 1 and j ≥ D). Define the polynomials,

B0(X) = a1,0 + a2,0X + a3,0X
2 + · · ·+ av,0X
v−1
.
.
.
Bk−1(X) = a1,k−1 + a2,k−1X + a3,k−1X
2 + · · ·
+ av,k−1X
v−1
We examine the condition that the coefficients of X i of the
polynomial Q(X) = A0(X)+A1(X)f(X)+A2(X)f(γX)+
· · ·+Av(X)f(γ
v−1X) = 0 equals 0, for i = 0 · · · k− 1. This
is equivalent to the following system of linear equations for
f0 · · · fk−1.


B0(γ
0) 0 0 · · · 0
B1(γ
0) B0(γ
1) 0 · · · 0
B2(γ
0) B1(γ
1) B0(γ
2) · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bk−1(γ
0) Bk−2(γ
1) Bk−3(γ
2) · · · B0(γ
k−1)


×


f0
f1
f2
.
.
.
fk−1

 =


−a0,0
−a0,1
−a0,2
.
.
.
−a0,k−1


(8)
The rank of the matrix of (Eqs. 8) is at least k−v+1 because
there are at most v − 1 solutions of equation B0(X) = 0 so
at most v − 1 of γi that makes B0(γi) = 0. The dimension
of solution space is at most v − 1 because the rank of matrix
of (Eqs. 8) is at least k − v + 1. So there are at most qv−1
solutions to (Eqs. 8) and this determines the size of the list
which is equal to qv−1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Proof: FRS decoding algorithm FRSdec requires,
N − ρwN > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
uRFRS
u− v + 1
) (9)
The dimension of the FRS code is bounded by,
k =uRFRSN = w⌈
ℓN + 2N
w − v
⌉+ uρrN
≤
w
w − v
(uRN + 3N) + uρrN.
(10)
The (10) holds because ℓ ≤ uR+1. So the decoding condition
for FRS code (9) holds if,
N − ρwN > N(
1
v + 1
+
v
v + 1
w
w−v (uR+ 3) + uρr
u− v + 1
)
From w = v2, it is equivalent to,
ρw <
v
v + 1
−
v
v + 1
v
v−1 (uR+ 3) + uρr
u− v + 1
.
